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Culture: (a) the integrated pattern of human knowl-
edge, belief, and behavior that depends upon man's 
capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to 
succeeding generations; (b) the customary beliefs, 
social forms, and material traits of a racial, reli-
gious, or social group  
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
INTRODUCTION1 
For a long time, social and cognitive scientists followed their own course, 
not really wondering what their academic neighbors were working on. The 
origin of this mutual indifference has been well laid out by Dilthey’s distinc-
tion between the Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) built upon the 
discoveries of explanatory physical mechanisms, and the 
Geisteswissenschaften (cultural sciences) driven by the hermeneutic compre-
hension of sociohistorical phenomena (Dilthey, 1883; Havelange, 1998). This 
division of scientific labor is still apparent within the disciplinary organization 
of the academic world, with every sub-discipline struggling to reach one of the 
essential aims of science: the cumulative growth of knowledge. Incompatible 
paradigms thus tend to develop in parallel their own theories and evidence, 
judging other approaches or related fields as being a priori irrelevant. Most of 
the time, this theoretical and methodological incompatibility results from con-
flicting anthropological views, which tend to go from one extreme to the other: 
the human mind is either seen as a “blank slate”, molded by the boundless 
force of contingent historical cultural systems in which it is immersed, or, on 
the contrary, as a set of universal, prewired abilities that allows it to make 
sense of its environment, mostly all by itself (Pinker, 2002). 
Recently, new insights into this everlasting opposition have been given by 
some neurobiologists, philosophers and psychologists. To them, pitting nature 
against culture as two opposite forces between which human species are tossed 
back and forth, escaping from biology to be better enslaved by culture and 
conversely, is pointless (Dennett, 2003; Lenclud, 2003; Valsiner, this issue). 
To them, nature and culture are not necessarily inversely proportional; on the 
contrary, the human mind is believed to be “prewired” for the cultural learning 
and knowledge acquisition that will eventually allow it to escape from a strict 
genetic determinism (Tomasello & Rakocszy, this issue; Wilson, 2005).  
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In spite of some profound divergences, all the contributions gathered in this 
issue of Intellectica share the idea that the study of culture cannot ignore the 
fact that nature plays an important role in the development of culture. Of 
course, the different papers expect various degrees of harmonization between 
the laws, theories and methods of the natural sciences and those of the social 
sciences. For some, naturalism is essentially the methodological reminder of 
the importance, for social scientists, to adopt an observational, ethological-like 
stance, which is appropriate to the public, objective, and external ontology of 
the objects of their inquiry. For others, naturalism is an exclusive ontological 
commitment to the reduction of immaterial phenomena not only to natural but 
also to physical facts, which are ultimately determined by the causal laws of 
matter. But all contributors, whether sociologists, philosophers, anthropolo-
gists, or psychologists, tend to accept that naturalism raises issues that can be 
relevant, in one way or another, to the social sciences. Admittedly, accepting a 
dialogue with naturalism is not sufficient to dissolve the long-lasting episte-
mological and ontological gap between the hard and soft sciences, and between 
nature and culture. But it at least permits us to rethink seriously the mediations, 
either individual or collective, which are susceptible to bridging the gap 
between the external, causal connections proper to the world of things and the 
internal, intentional relations proper to the universe of meanings.  
Interestingly, an important part of these bridge-making mediations can be 
gathered under the overall term of cognition whose actual sense looks more 
and more “social scientist-compatible”. In cognitive science, indeed, the study 
of cognition is no longer monopolized by the functionalist model of artificial 
intelligence (Lassègue & Visetti, 2002). For a long time, indeed, mainstream 
cognitive science has entertained an artificial model of a “culture-proof” 
cognition, driven by mechanisms impervious to cultural framing or supra-
individual categorization. Most cognitive scientists were focused on individual 
low-level information processing or/and high-level psychological representa-
tions. Invariant cognitive commonalities were held causally responsible for the 
dissemination of certain “informational” representations that, once largely 
spread throughout a given population, were said to deserve the status of cul-
tural representations. More recently, this kind of approach has been called into 
question by numerous cognitivists drawing inspiration from developmental 
psychology, Gestalt psychology, and social psychology as well as from anthro-
pology, cognitive sociology, and ethology. Many cognitivists are indeed 
rediscovering, notably through comparative experimental research such as 
Nisbett’s one (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett & Masuda, this issue), that basic cogni-
tive processes might be culture-dependent. They are also calling into question 
the assumption of the human Cartesian mind, which prevailed in artificial 
intelligence as well as in developmental psychology. In fact, rather than seeing 
the neonate as engaged in protoscientific activities (e.g., seeking, testing, 
hypothesizing, remembering) and constructing his or her theory of others from 
a “spectatorial” point of view, recent findings portray cognition from the phe-
nomenological, insider’s point of view (Hutto, 2004; Gallagher, 2006). Instead 
of referring to the processing of remote, estranged objects of observation and 
prediction, cognition tends to be defined as an embodied practice of attunement 
to socially significant others. Even in the neurosciences, social cognition, that 
is, the recognition and prediction of others’ behaviors, is said to be more a 
matter of infraconscious anticipation and situated action parsing than a matter 
of computation of information (Frith & Wolpert, 2004). This view of cognition 
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as embodied practice paves the way for a reconceptualization of social cogni-
tion as being non-mentalistic and of natural instinct as being fundamentally 
social.  
Insofar as recent approaches to cognition encompass all the processes, such 
as categorization, memory, and attention, through which society and/or shared 
culture enter the mind, it has become difficult for the social sciences to main-
tain their indifference to, if not their contempt for, cognition studies. It is all 
the more difficult as the focus on the cognitive procedures that allow social 
agents to build and maintain a sense of surrounding physical or cultural struc-
tures does not necessarily imply the reduction of cultural facts to mental or 
“cerebral” facts. The study of the cognitive equipment that enables agents to 
sustain social and cultural facts pleads in itself neither for epistemological 
reductionism (e.g., the methods of justification and explanation proper to the 
natural sciences have absolute priority over those of the social sciences) nor for 
ontological reductionism (e.g., the only things that really exist are the most 
primitive constituents in the universe, namely physical particles and forces). 
The study of cognition consists in making explicit the assumptions about 
cognitive processes that underlie the prevailing approaches in social science, 
whether it be the model of strategic, conscious actor specific to methodological 
individualism and games theory, the model of unconscious “patient” proper to 
structuralism and holism, or the model of pragmatic agents proper to symbolic 
interactionism. Interestingly, these controversial assumptions, while metatheo-
retical to social scientists, are keenly empirical from the standpoint of cognitive 
psychology, which could assess their consistency with the results of empirical 
research on cognition (di Maggio, 1997). 
In fact, the reassessments of the traditional “top-down”, “culture-shapes-
mind” approach and of the “bottom-up”, “mind-shapes-culture” approach of 
cognition and culture lead to the same question: how are we to describe the 
complex interrelations between mental and cultural processes? This question, 
which is at the center of this volume of Intellectica, has been handled quite 
differently according to the disciplines, paradigms and cultural backgrounds of 
the contributors. Although a distinction between “bottom-up” versus “top-
down” tendencies still underlies the different stances in presence, it does so in 
a much more subtle way than in the past. Most authors are drawn to the idea of 
“naturalism”, at least in the weak sense of the term; that is, the will to use the 
concepts and methods that are compatible with, but not necessarily reducible 
to, those of the natural sciences. Every contribution can be thus seen as a dif-
ferent way to connect biological, psychological, social and cultural dimensions 
within an ontologically coherent framework. That is why, in this introduction, 
our objective is to weave the different contributions together into a broad out-
line of some of the possible connections between cultural and cognitive 
processes. Of course, such a large-scale cartography does not claim to do jus-
tice to the complexity and density of the different papers. Neither does it claim 
to cover all the attempts to explore the link between cognition and culture; 
actually, most of the contributions are underpinned by a more or less explicit 
Neo-Darwinian conception of evolution, notably put forward by evolutionary 
psychologists and cognitive anthropologists, in which natural selection and 
adaptedness play a key role (on the different theories of evolution, see Mayr, 
2002; Guillo, 2007). Important criticisms, for instance by Gould & Lewontin 
(1979), have been raised against this conception, suggesting that there are other 
motors of evolutionary change besides selection and reproductive success. By 
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calling into question the assumed neo-darwinian links between the concepts of 
fitness, adaptation and natural selection, these less prevalent conceptions of 
evolution could certainly shed a different light on the relationships between 
cognition and culture. It just goes to show that this volume does not pretend to 
be exhaustive but only gives a glimpse at the possible paths for naturalizing 
culture.  
CULTURE AS EMERGING FROM EVOLVED PSYCHOLOGIES 
Naturalism can be defined as a theoretical approach whose objective is to 
only recruit in its explanations the concepts and principles that are compatible 
with those of the natural sciences (Proust, 1998). But beyond this overall 
ambition, naturalist approaches vary significantly in their apprehension of the 
ontology of socio-cultural entities.  
A reductionist stance was favored, until recently, by most naturalist 
ventures into the social sciences; its tendency is to adopt an ontological 
naturalism that refuses to recognize as ontologically acceptable the presumably 
disembodied, abstract, if not ghostly, status of socio-cultural entities. 
Ontological reductionism assumes that the only things that really exist are 
basic natural elements. In its radical version, the assumption that the world is 
of a piece leads to physicalism and thereby to a kind of ontological 
reductionism: the most primitive constituents in the universe, namely physical 
particles and forces, determine all the properties of things, social phenomena 
included. Such reductionism assumes material identity between the empirical 
referents of neurological and mental states, or mental and social phenomena, 
and hence their strict correspondence in the world independently of any 
observer’s perspective (Collin, 1997, p. 230-232). In the same way that the 
extension of the concept of water is said to be empirically replaceable with its 
molecular formula H2O, the extension of mental states, whether conscious or 
not, is said to be replaceable with their neurological substrate at each stage of 
their development (Searle, 1983). Ontological reductionism generally comes 
with epistemological reductionism: it is based on the principle that all 
phenomena can and must be explained in terms of natural causes and laws or 
biological processes of perception and action. Strong epistemological reduc-
tionism gives absolute priority to the methods of justification and explanation 
proper to the natural sciences, that is, the appeal to causes, and postulates that a 
suitable analysis of a given concept must be amenable to facts susceptible to 
empirical inquiry. 
In most of their reductionist versions, ontological and epistemological natu-
ralism are hence physicalist and mentalist: they admit the existence of mental 
representations that future bridge laws will hopefully be able to relate, one fine 
day, to their neural substrate. From a materialistic point of view, as Dan 
Sperber put it, there are only “mental representations, which are born, live, and 
die within individuals skulls, and public representations which are plain mate-
rial phenomena – sound waves, light patterns, etc; – in the environment of 
individuals ” (Sperber, 1990, p. 28). From this perspective, the study of culture 
comes down to the understanding of the way specific psychological mecha-
nisms favor the diffusion of representations within a given population – the so-
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called “epidemiology of representations” (Sperber, 1996; Boyer, 2001; Atran, 
2002)2. 
One of the latest manifestations of this resolutely reductionist perspective is 
evolutionary psychology. The premises are straightforward: the forces of evo-
lution, and in particular the process of selection, are not exerted only on our 
bodies. As Jesse Bering (2006, p. 142) put it, “minds bear the thumbprint of 
evolution as well.” The mind of a given organism, just like its physiology, is 
genetically adapted to its ancestral environment. Since domain-specific infor-
mation processing is believed to be more adaptive than general, all-purpose 
information processing, evolved minds are defined as a collection of 
specialized mechanisms (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). All these basic mecha-
nisms would have thus been “designed” by natural selection to solve the 
specific problems raised by the regularities of the physical, chemical, ecologi-
cal, informational, and social environments encountered by the ancestors of a 
species during the course of its evolution (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).  
Since genetic evolution is extremely slow, it has not kept pace with the so-
cial and environmental changes that have characterized the story of humanity. 
The basic design features of the human mind have evolved in adapting to a life 
in which prehistoric hunter-gatherers related to one another face-to-face within 
small-scale cooperative bands (Dunbar et al., 1999). Therefore, the “solutions” 
that human psychology has evolved to survive in the past might be ill-adapted 
to the complex conditions of contemporary society (Pinker, 1997; Wilson, 
2006). Within this framework, culture refers less to the social transmission of 
information than to what Tooby & Cosmides (1992) call “evoked culture”: 
“Evoked culture” emerges from the encounter of the universal, cognitive 
equipment, which enabled human beings to adapt to their ancestral 
environment, with the local, complex conditions of the actual environment they 
are immersed in. In other words, culture is said to refer, at least partly, to the 
behavioral and ideational similarities within groups – similarities that result 
from the convergence of the responses of panhuman psychological 
mechanisms to the same local context (Fessler 2006). The approach proper to 
evolutionary psychology is therefore an individualistic approach: collective 
phenomena are the more or less permanent results of the cognitive processes 
taking place at the individual level. Human culture is considered to be “the 
aggregate output of evolved psychologies operating in concert with regular 
variance in socio-ecologies” (Bering & Schakelford, 2007). However, starting 
from evolved psychologies does not mean that culture is deprived of a genuine 
weight on the shaping of the mind. In fact, for Richerson and Boyd (2004), 
cultural adaptation can become a biological adaptation thanks to a “gene-
culture coevolution”, an evolutionary modification in one species inducing an 
evolutionary change in another. For instance, the complex cultural adaptation 
of dairying traditions constituted a new culturally evolved environment that 
increased the relative fitness of the gene that enables whole-milk consumption 
by adults. As that gene spread, it in turn may have changed the environment by 
shaping cultural food practices that favor more whole-milk consumption (e.g., 
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 However, Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004, p. 45) recently specified their position: “We agree with 
standard social science that culture is not human psychology writ large and that it would make little 
sense to seek a psychological reductionist explanation of culture”. Their position is therefore better 
described as a methodological reductionism than an ontological one. 
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ice-cream, cheese) (Richerson & Boyd, 2004, p. 192). Other studies show that 
the domestication or ‘‘enculturation’’ of dogs, which might have started, 
depending on the account, around either 135,000 or 14,000 years ago, induced 
a genetic adaptation to human environment. Given the survival advantages of 
human companionship, dogs became predisposed to learn communicative 
signals, to obey rules and to constrain fear and aggressiveness (Soproni, 2001).  
As interesting as this approach might be, it raises serious issues even for a 
naturalistic point of view. These issues can be separated into two broad catego-
ries. On one side, the reductionist, evolutionary view tends to neglect an 
essential part of culture, namely communicated representations. As Tomasello 
and Rakoczy put it (this issue, p. 27), “langages, symbolic mathematics and 
complex social institutions are not individual inventions arising out of humans’ 
extraordinary individual brainpower”. On the other side, strong reductionist 
positions like evolutionary psychology tend to consider each individual as an 
isolated, autonomous “mental world” with sporadic contacts with the 
“outside”, that is, the cultural environment. Of course, this position has already 
been criticized in the past but contemporary researchers are adding new 
empirical and theorical elements against this “monadologist” perspective.  
CULTURE AS EMERGING FROM COMPLEX COMMUNICATIVE AND 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
Even if we take for granted, for the sake of the argument, that mental repre-
sentations belong to the physical realm and that the structure of evolved brains 
are similar enough to produce universal responses to certain kinds of environ-
mental stimuli, this would only attach significance to a limited number of 
cultural phenomena (“evoked culture”). Even from a biological perspective, 
culture involves information that is transmitted through nongenetic means 
among group members (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998). As Fessler put it (2006), 
our ability to survive as a species is primarily due to our capacity to acquire, 
share, elaborate, and employ socially transmitted information. Now, from the 
angle of the learning and communicating processes by which agents start at 
birth to assemble and reshape transmitted meanings, culture is no longer, as 
Robertson (1996) wittily put it, “a geriatric phenomenon”: far from being the 
prerogative of the resolved mind of experienced, mainly male, adults, culture is 
also graspable in the tentative imaginings of youths, who work at identifying 
what information is conveyed “for” them to be selectively acquired.  
TOMASELLO AND RAKOCZY’s opening paper starts from this very observa-
tion. Without the informative input of others, it is very likely that humans 
would not differ very much from other great apes. What primarily character-
izes homo sapiens is, therefore, the capacity to create and share cultural 
activities and products. A major issue is thus to identify which of the child’s 
cognitive capacities are necessary to take advantage of the surrounding culture. 
Tomasello and Rakoczy summarize the main achievements that enable children 
to become cultural animals. Firstly, an important psychological revolution 
occurs at approximately 9-12 months of age: relationships become triadic since 
they involve (1) the infant, (2) the adult, and (3) the objects/events in the 
world. Infants begin to look where adults are looking (“gaze following”), keep 
a close watch on adults’ emotional expressions to evaluate an unknown stimu-
lus (“social referencing”), and act on objects in the same way adults are acting 
on them (“imitative learning”). Later, the ability to focus attention on particular 
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objects becomes particularly important for the acquisition of linguistic sym-
bols. Thanks to this joint attention, indeed, sounds become vehicles for 
meanings because they “count as” something else for all the participants in a 
common activity. Technically, it means that mutual comprehension is possible 
only if the interlocutors refer to the same “intentional” object: their thought 
must be “about” the same object. Finally, at about 4-5 years of age, children 
discover that other agents can entertain mental representations about the world 
that differ from their own. The comprehension of the “distance” between what 
is in the mind and what is in the world is the key to more abstract parts of cul-
ture. Actually, humans can share intentional objects that have no perceptual 
counterparts and think of worlds which exist only in the imagination but can be 
vivid enough to be seen as real.  
Tomasello’s and Rakoczy’s paper constitutes a state of art description of 
the cognitive abilites humans mobilize to acquire the cultural representations of 
their society. From a naturalistic point of view, however, this developmental 
perspective does not yet explain how representations disseminate and stabilize 
themselves in a population. That is precisely the aim of memetics, which 
attempts to adopt an evolutionary perspective on culture without reducing it to 
psychology. As Dominique GUILLO points out, memeticians refuse to assimi-
late culture to the mental furnishing of the psychological realm; on the 
contrary, they assume that cultural representations have an ontology of their 
own. Drawing inspiration from the preliminary remarks of the biologist 
Richard Dawkins (1976), memeticians think of cultural entities on the model of 
genes (Dennett, 1990; Blackmore, 1999). Like genes, memes are replicators, 
i.e. units of information producing exact copies of themselves through a 
process of cultural transmission that uses the material resources provided by 
their environment. Subject to the same process of replication, variation and 
selection as genes, the content of the memes evolves, as does their respective 
frequency in populations. The evolution of memes is decoupled from the evo-
lution of the organisms and the genes that sustain them, and hence constitutes 
an autonomous level of selection. Like selfish genes, they furiously compete 
for the occupation of niches, in this case our minds. From a memetic perspec-
tive, therefore, culture is not something ideational or abstract; it is “a concrete 
collection of units of information that exist in the heads of different members 
of a given society or social group, and which have no genetic basis” (Guillo, p. 
53).  
Memetics is an original, exciting model but it is problematic in several 
respects. As Guillo illustrates in great detail, memeticians fail to fulfill an ele-
mentary naturalist commitment: that of specifying the nature of memes. In fact, 
memes are neither behaviors, nor artefacts, nor beliefs or neural networks 
because those are only individual phenotypes, or “phemotypes”, that is, the 
expressions of memes (Auger, 2000). A meme designates the set of abstract 
informational properties that underlies its various manifestations or 
occurrences. In other words, memes are “semantic” units whose causal powers 
remain mysterious. Moreover, the copy-like mode of cultural transmission that 
allegedly allows memes to “jump” from one head to another is based on a con-
ception of imitation that has been strongly criticized by anthropologists and 
psychologists. Imitation is a transmission process that involves an intense, and 
largely unconscious, cognitive activity from the receiver so that no contents 
can be passed on without changes (Sperber & Wilson, 1996; Sperber, 2000). 
Developmental psychologists have recently demonstrated that children do far 
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more than passively copy perceived behaviors; they interpret actions and 
attribute goals in such a way that their imitation can substantially differ from 
the initial behavior they have observed (Gergely & al., 2002; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003; Meltzoff, 1995).  
As a result, not only does memetics leave the ontology of memes vague and 
unsolved but it postulates a transparent, direct mode of transmission that is 
highly questionable. Although memetics can be useful and open new areas of 
questioning culture, its scientific imports from biology remain, from a 
naturalist point of view, largely metaphorical. Given this flaw, it seems more 
reasonable to study empirically how different elements of cultural systems are 
transmitted. In particular, an important issue is to study how concretely chil-
dren assimilate the cultural representations, and even the less concrete entities, 
which are disseminated by the more experienced members of their group. This 
is precisely the task that HARRIS, ABARBANELL, PASQUINI AND DUKE 
undertake in their paper. During the last few years, Paul Harris has revisited a 
conception largely shared by developmental psychologists by insisting on the 
fact that children learn about reality not only through first hand observation of 
concrete, tangible materials, but also from others’ testimony about events or 
entities that they cannot observe for themselves (Harris, 2002; Koenig & 
Harris, 2005; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Clément and al., 2003). In their contri-
bution, Harris et al. report that even young children (4-5 years old) manage to 
distinguish different kinds of testimony-based, cultural representations. They 
are able to discriminate the ontological status of three kinds of invisible entities 
that can be contemplated only via the imagination: “scientific beings”, that is, 
normally invisible entities or substances established by experimentation or 
inference (e.g. germs and oxygen), “endorsed beings” whose existence is 
endorsed by most adults when they speak to young children (e.g. God and 
Santa Claus) and “equivocal beings” whose existence is not routinely endorsed 
in discourse with children (e.g. monsters and ghosts). Despite considering 
scientific and endorsed entities as more “real” than equivocal beings, children 
show themselves to be more confident with their ontological judgment on 
scientific entities than endorsed beings. How do children make such subtle 
distinctions?  
Two main options seem possible. The first option is based on the patterns of 
testimony: children might hear adults around them voicing skepticism about 
the existence of special beings, which is not the case for scientific entities, 
which are rarely open to doubt. The second option is that children might be 
attentive to the causal properties of the different entities they are told about and 
might conclude, from their own experience, knowledge and inferences, that 
special beings have extraordinary causal powers. To discriminate between 
those two options, Harris et al. planned to study the transmission of cultural 
representations in traditional communities, where beliefs in special beings 
routinely suffuse everyday life but are rarely the subject of either overt state-
ments of doubt or explicit avowal of faith. A preliminary study among children 
of the Tseltal-speaking Mayan community of Tenejapa (Mexico) shows a pat-
tern of results very similar to the pattern obtained in North-America: children 
claim that endorsed beings exist, but with less confidence than for real entities, 
and they express more confidence in the existence of scientific entities than in 
that of endorsed beings. Those cross-cultural results might indicate that chil-
dren in all cultures have a fairly strong ontological intuition that anomalous or 
supernatural beings are different from, and less credible than, ordinary or 
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scientific beings. The assimilation of culture might thus be filtered by different 
ontological assumptions in such a way that consensual testimony on well-
endorsed entities would not be sufficient to make children blindly believe in 
them. For Harris et al., it remains to be seen, however, whether the results from 
Tenejapa children were due to their natural clear-headedness or to their expo-
sure, through modern informational sources such as radio or television, to 
contradictory large-scale information about locally endorsed entities. If this 
second hypothesis is true, children who grow up in isolated communities 
should find the beliefs of their community wholly convincing and inescapable.  
The approaches briefly summarized above have the advantage of giving a 
better account of how collective cultural products that preexist individuals’ 
existence are psychologically “accommodated”. A common assumption, 
however, underlies the account of culture as communicative system of 
knowledge transfer: this is that mind and culture are mutually “external”, like 
two separate entities that coexist without merging together. To become mental 
representations, cultural representations have, so to speak, “to get across” the 
individual epistemic frontier. This ontological duality is called into question by 
the contributors who insist on the practical way that culture bearers incorporate 
cultural forms and contents. 
CULTURE AS PRACTICES EMBEDDED IN A FORM OF LIFE 
The naturalist paradigm, even when it is applied to the human world, is 
obviously influenced by the way in which “naturalists” try to make sense of the 
behavior of non-human species. From an evolutionary point of view, animals 
tend to be seen as sophisticated computational machines whose reactions to the 
environment have been adjusted by eons of selection. In this context, commu-
nication processes fit into a utilitarian scheme: exchanged signals are used by 
animals to obtain a certain advantage over competition. 
Véronique SERVAIS’s contribution sheds a critical light on this paradigm. 
As a cognitive ethologist well aware of the risk of anthropomorphism, she is 
careful not to apply to animals’ exchange signals the conceptual tools drawn 
from the human sciences. Because of this ill-considered conceptual import, 
indeed, researchers in animal cognition have imposed the model of information 
transmission upon animal communication. This theoretical twist, once inte-
grated into an evolutionary Machiavellian paradigm, had serious consequences: 
communication was seen as a means of manipulating others. Since the signaler 
can conceal its “true” motivation or intention, the receiver has to develop 
counterstrategies to avoid being exploited. The study of animal communication 
has thus taken the form of a cost-benefit analysis that assumes complex and 
intentional decisional processes in communicators’ minds. To Servais, this 
conception is misleading because it is based on a partial model of animal 
communication; in fact, this latter is less a matter of information transmission 
than a means of establishing relationships. “By focusing only on the informa-
tional side, the transmission model of communication precluded overtures 
towards the relational dimensions of communication – and a relational point of 
view” (Servais, this volume, p. 92). Birdsongs, for example, can be described 
as action by which the signaler negotiates its territory boundaries, signaling its 
readiness to interact aggressively, or indecisiveness. As Horn (1997) put it, 
“the song it sings replaces physical interaction”. Not only are animals like 
birds able to detect the relationships in which they are engaged with their 
conspecifics, but they can also “decide” to express or retain a call depending 
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on the context. The signals regulating relationships are not simply bound to a 
series of causal reactions: “the communication process is seen as the “decision” 
of a brain to send or retain a signal, according to the rational assessment of the 
social situation” (Servais, this volume, p. 94). This still-mysterious decision 
process is therefore based on (1) the nature of the social relationship that it 
“seen” or perceived by the animals, leading to different expectancies and frus-
trations; and (2) the types of emotion that correspond to the different relations 
in which the animals are engaged. From this perspective, communication is 
less a transfer of information than a way by which some relational regularity is 
brought into social life. 
If the mind is already so closely intertwined with the situation it has to cope 
with in the animal realm, one can expect that such intertwining will be further 
reinforced in the cultural situations proper to mankind. This is precisely what 
Louis QUÉRÉ shows in his well-crafted discussion of the concept of trust. 
Cognitive scientists tend to consider trust within an “externalist” paradigm: in 
developmental studies, for example, children’s decisions to integrate commu-
nicated representations into their “stock” of beliefs rest on the trust they invest 
in the source of testimony (Clément & al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). A 
similar twist is given in the attempts to “naturalize” trust in game theory and 
research in neuroscience: here, trust is described as an ephemeral event-like 
state-change operation, whose biochemical traces in the brain or the body can 
be measured by empirical techniques. For Quéré, although the natural origin, 
either ontogenetic or phylogenetic, of cultural, normative phenomenon such as 
trust might be accounted for by a “soft naturalism”, culture is not reducible to 
natural, material facts. This naturalistic reduction, by assuming that trust is a 
material process, makes two category mistakes. On one hand, it forgets that 
trust is not a mental, internal episode of decision-making, observable as such; it 
is a long-term process whose temporal thickness belongs to the category of 
dispositions, not events. On the other hand, trust has a normative dimension 
that a physical description in terms of mechanisms cannot account for; in fact, 
it is within a normative shared context that the truster can expect, and has the 
right to claim, that the trustee will respect his or her commitment. Thus under-
pinned by mutual expectations, commitments and obligations, the reality of 
trust can only be caught through the filter of intentional language and cultural 
form of life, “which permeates our experience, perception and understanding” 
(Quéré, this volume). Ultimately, trust depends less on the trustworthiness of 
others than on the reliability of the normal course of action that cultural norms, 
incorporated in and enacted by common categorizations and assumptions, 
make possible (Quéré & Ogien, 2006). 
In Quéré’s view, the cultural, normative shaping of a phenomenon like trust 
cannot be reduced to any material substrate since it is constitutive of the phe-
nomenological and linguistic experience of agents. Trust is an integral part of a 
practical, embodied “seeing as” that enables competent members to recognize a 
relationship or a feeling as an occurrence of trust. In this framework culture, far 
from being an abstract set of representations or a theoretical mode of under-
standing, is embodied in public practices and background expectancies. In 
other words, cultural phenomena are external to the individuals but internal to a 
community of practice and language: it is primarily a form of life, known, 
experienced and felt “from within”.  
While interestingly avoiding the theoretical hypertrophy of strategic 
decision-making, this “proximal”, practical, and embodied conception of cul-
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ture remains challenging for even a moderate naturalist approach,. First, it 
requires norms to be integrated, in one way or another, into the natural world 
(for an attempt, see Kaufmann & Clément, this volume). Second, how human 
bodies become the main substrate of a culture-bound form of life has still to be 
laid out. Jordan ZLATEV’s contribution can be seen as an attempt to take up this 
very challenge. In a naturalist move that ties up neuro-physiology with lan-
guage, Zlatev uses the recent discovery of mirror neurons to explain how 
people are capable of attributing common meanings to arbitrary sounds. From 
an ontogenetic point of view, children must be able to figure out what is 
referred to by the emitted sounds. Grasping what the words are about is made 
possible by the existence of pre-linguistic concepts that “carve” the reality in a 
similar way for language teachers and learners. According to Zlatev, this 
commonality is based on the functioning of the brain itself: mirrors neurons 
fire both when someone performs an action and when they observe the same 
action performed by someone else. This neuronal “resonance”, enacted in the 
“mimetic schemas” that Zlatev speaks of (e.g. eating, crying, running, etc.), 
might be the foundation for a basic, fundamental intersubjectivity that guaran-
tees a common world of reference to human beings. In this view, culture is 
initially proximal: it is built upon a proto-cultural mechanism that weaves indi-
viduals and meanings together.  
One of the main issues, then, is to determine how proximal culture can be, 
that is, to what extent the different forms of life forge the cognitive apprehen-
sion of the world. While insisting on initial, proto-cultural commonalities, 
Zlatev does remark that mimetics schemas may be more or less culture-specific 
(e.g. kissing). Do the various ways in which different cultures occupy and 
make sense of the environment mark the cognitive competences or 
performances of their members? This question haunts Richard Nisbett’s recent 
research, the results of which have shaken the universalist premises that prevail 
in cognitive science. For a long time, Nisbett himself assumed that inductive 
and deductive inference, attention, memory, categorization, and causal analysis 
were the same for everyone in every culture. That was until one of his doctoral 
students, who was native of China, pointed out in a discussion that there was a 
major, inevitable difference between their ways of processing information: the 
professor was thinking along a line, the student on a circle (Nisbett, 2003). 
Puzzled, Nisbett designed numerous ingenious experiments to test the degree 
of influence of culture on basic cognitive processes. The results, summarized in 
NISBETT AND MASUDA’s contribution, are stunning. The ways in which East 
Asian and Americans perceive the world diverge in some very important 
respects. Because of these cultural “lenses”, even a simple scene of fish swim-
ming in an aquarium is perceived differently: whereas Westerners are inclined 
to focus on the substantial, intrinsic properties of the fish themselves (e.g., 
colour, shape, etc.), East Asians tend to pay attention to the field and to the 
relations between the fish and the field. Such differences are also present in 
logical abilities, with East Asians being more comfortable with apparent con-
tradiction (dialectics) than Americans (logic). Even the way things are 
categorized varies across eastern and western culture: while East Asians clas-
sify objects and events on the basis of relationships and family resemblance, 
Americans recruit rule-based category membership. Once put together, the 
results of this Geography of Thought (Nisbett, 2003) show that cognition is 
much more pervaded by culture than most cognitive scientists thought it to be. 
Cultural expectations and categorizations, which foster the “attentional bias” 
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that Nisbett and Masuda’s work suggests, frame and shape cognitive processes 
in a largely non-conscious way. 
Coming from such an important player in the cognitive field, Nisbett’s 
findings are disturbing for everyone who had assumed a certain commonality 
between human minds, that was ensured by their common evolutionary history. 
Given the importance of culture in the shaping of human perception and rea-
soning, even naturalists can wonder to what extent shared biologies lead to 
common cognitive processes. Rita ASTUTI’s paper dwells on precisely this 
issue. Her approach is part of a recent effort made by some anthropologists to 
“import” methodological tools from psychology to their own fieldwork (Bloch, 
2005; Astuti & al., 2004; Fessler, 2004). Astuti’s case study is extremely rele-
vant because the population she studied, the Vezo from Madagascar, is well 
known in the anthropological literature for being impervious to the ontological 
distinction between facts of biology and facts of sociality (Ingold, 1991). For 
example, they do not make comments on the resemblance between babies and 
their birth parents. On the contrary, the Vezo seem to attribute resemblance 
between those who are related through social intercourse, and not through con-
ception and birth. This conception is especially disturbing for those who 
hypothesize a universal folkbiology system that includes the “invariable 
presumption that the various members of each generic species share a unique 
underlying nature, or biological essence” (Atran, 1999, p. 317). The idea 
behind Astuti’s experiments is therefore to see how the Vezo “stick” to the 
knowledge they have elaborated through cultural learning when confronted 
with experimental procedures that test their intuitions about biological entities. 
The test chosen is the “adoption task”, which was initially designed to explore 
children’s understanding of the role played by nurture and procreation in the 
transmission of properties from parents to offspring (Solomon & al., 1996). 
Subjects, who are told a simple story about a baby born to one set of parents 
and raised by another, must judge whether the adopted child will resemble the 
birth parent in terms of bodily properties (e.g., having blond as opposed to dark 
hair) or in terms of mental properties such as beliefs (e.g., believing that 
skunks can see in the dark as opposed to believing that skunks cannot see in 
the dark). If the cultural system of the Vezo permeates and modifies their bio-
logical intuitions, they should respond that the adopted child will resemble the 
adoptive parents in terms of all or almost all traits. But this is not what the 
results indicate. On the contrary, Vezo adults do differentiate between causal 
mechanisms that concern generating children, and those that concern with 
nurturing them. Therefore, Vezo are far from being cognitively submitted to 
the explicit, public representations of their culture. The Vezo’s explicit allega-
tion about the prevalence of facts of sociality over facts of biology in the 
domain of child rearing does not mean that they do not process the difference 
between what is biologically and what is socially inherited. Rather, they 
exhibit a cultural value that is socially relevant in a collectivity in which chil-
dren are molded by a much larger network of relations than the ones demar-
cated by their birth parents.  
This fascinating study illustrates the complexity of the fabric that weaves 
cultural forms, cultural contents and cognitive processes together. Different 
degrees and modes of interaction between culture and cognition seem possible. 
From a “distal” standpoint, indeed, culture essentially refers to the public 
representations, more or less explicitly communicated, that the members of a 
given community have in common. To take up a classical term in psychology, 
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culture is thought of as a “knowing that”, a series of explicit representations 
that are kept away from everyday knowledge and experience. The problem is 
that such cognitive distance between cultural representations and everyday life 
is hardly compatible with the ontological commitment and immoderate self-
implication that culture can trigger. By contrast, from a “proximal” standpoint, 
culture refers to the modes or habits of thinking that “in-form” cognitive 
processes; and is thought of, as such, as a “knowing how”. In this case, the 
problem is that when taken to extremes, this “in-forming”, proximal concep-
tion of culture, risks enclosing the different cultures, and their members, in 
separated and impervious worlds. As always, the challenge is thus to find a 
middle-way by understanding how those two dimensions of culture, proximal 
and distal, practical and representational, can hold together.  
SOCIAL FORMS, CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND ENCULTURED 
PSYCHOLOGY 
One important issue of this volume remains to be mentioned. If we want to 
keep up with the naturalistic agenda it is important to hypothesize what the 
natural origin of complex cultural phenomena could be. A promising line of 
argument is that the missing link between natural facts and cultural system 
might be an important feature of human evolution, namely sociality.  
Recently, it has been admitted that solving the problems induced by social 
living was one of the most important constraints on the evolution of the human 
mind (Humphrey, 1976; Dunbar, 2001; 2003). One could therefore hypothesize 
that it is through sociality that the gap between high-level, abstract cultural 
institutions and more fundamental ways of living together can be bridged. 
Lawrence HIRSCHFELD’s interesting paper on folk sociology builds up the first 
layer of this continuum. For him, all social animals face the enduring problem 
of coordinating their behavior with that of the members of their own group, as 
well as with the members of other social groups. Primates notably owe the 
emergence of higher-order cognitive capacities to the increasingly complex 
forms of groups they are living in; whether human and non-humans, they 
belong to many social groupings based on territory, intra-group status, sex, 
kinship and coalitions. Any of these memberships provides a useful basis for 
predicting and interpreting the behavior of others. Thanks to membership cues, 
social beings might indeed avoid the cost of unpredictable interactions with 
strangers and ensure relatively low-cost coordination with relevant nearby 
conspecifics. To Hirschfeld, social predictions based upon affiliations and 
memberships “are sufficiently specific and complex to suggest the possibility 
of a special-purpose modular competence in naïve or folk sociology” 
(Hirschfeld, this volume, p. 194). This domain-specific competence, which he 
calls naive sociology, refers to a set of modules which enables us to reason in 
terms of groups and social categories like race, gender, kinship or social occu-
pations. The inputs of these modules are constituted by whatever provides 
evidence for group membership, for instance individual bodily appearance, 
behavior, language and so on. To Hirschfeld, cultural categorization might be 
primarily a high-level elaboration of these membership cues, such as cultural 
gender dimorphism superimposed on natural sexual dimorphism. Of course, 
cultural derivations from basic-level membership assessment can become very 
problematic when they lead to the segmentation of the human world into dis-
crete racial, ethnic or gender populations (Hirschfeld, 1996). It is all the more 
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problematic that their “anchoring” in a social modular competence makes them 
particularly resistant to change. Such resistance to change shows how cognitive 
primitives, largely shared by humans and other primates, contribute to shaping 
culture.  
Bernard CONEIN also insists on the importance, for the social sciences, of 
studying the mode of constitution of social groups as well as the proto-social 
mechanisms that allow evolved animals, whether human or not, to recognize, 
comprehend and monitor social relationships. His contribution highlights an 
important dichotomy between two currents of research on social cognition. In 
developmental psychology and philosophy, social groups are mostly seen as 
the results of individuals’ mutual actions and reactions. In this perspective, 
groups are a matter of mental coordination and “group actions are accom-
plished by the careful alignment to the attentional states of others” (Conein, 
this volume, p. 213). In behavioral ecology and ethology, by contrast, social 
groups are related to membership, dominance and affiliative behaviors. Within 
this framework, groups refer to the enduring relational structures that put evo-
lutionary pressure on primate cognition, thereby leading to the selection of 
specific modules devoted to relations processing. For Conein, however, these 
two perspectives are not mutually exclusive because the existence of groups 
induces and requires two kinds of skills. Group members must possess cogni-
tive skills that enable them to assess and monitor relationships. This task is 
performed by domain-specific devices that could be brought together under the 
aegis of what Hirschfeld calls naive sociology. But to Conein, individuals must 
also perform all kinds of activities that are devoted to establishing and main-
taining strong ties among partners. In other words, social beings have to 
regulate their mutual actions by taking into account and predicting whenever 
possible the behavior of particular individuals. That is where the pivotal role of 
the cognitive abilities necessary for gaze following, intention detection, and 
joint attention come into the picture: they are at the heart of the “social sense” 
that Conein (2005) speaks of. 
The idea that an essential part of social activities consists in detecting and 
interpreting (largely non-consciously) social regularities is also the leading line 
of the argument of KAUFMANN and CLEMENT. This paper’s ambition is to 
organize the different levels of complexity of cultural phenomena into a natu-
ralistic architecture that is as coherent as possible. The basic building blocks of 
this architecture are said to be social forms, i.e. primitive actions (fighting, 
sharing, exchanging, consoling, reconciliating) as well as basic relational 
“formats” (cooperation, domination, competition). The main hypothesis is that 
social forms, given their public, natural and universal properties, are good can-
didates for bridging the ontological gap between nature and culture. Culture 
can, indeed, be seen as “high-level semantic elaboration and redescription of 
elementary social facts” (Kaufmann & Clément, this volume p. 226). One of 
the main cognitive mechanisms necessary for creating and grasping this high-
level cultural elaboration is analogy-making. Analogies allow human minds to 
«draw» cultural forms from the world of nature, either physical or social, and 
contribute therefore to the elaboration of a sphere of collective experience 
that is both cultural and intuitive. Since cultural analogies, Kaufmann & 
Clément contend, derive from the preexistent natural and social saliences, they 
tend to reinforce and perpetuate the socio-cultural order. In fact, analogical 
mapping can be a very effective ideological device that masks the arbitrary 
origin of social hierarchy and inequality behind an alleged law of nature. But 
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analogy making can also be used as a weapon in a process of “de-
naturalization” of the worldview by making an alternative model of society 
look as, if not more, intuitive as the dominant cultural order. In this framework, 
social forms and cultural constructs appear much closer to nature than in other 
approaches, for instance those which portray culture as counterintuitive 
representations or as an imaginative leap. For cultural variation does not 
depend only on symbolic, arbitrary, and “distal” creations; it also depends in 
part on the uneven degree of attention granted to the social and natural 
affordances that carve social life. Selective attention to some social primitives 
at the expense of others is said to be one of the marks of culture. From the 
standpoint of cultural participant, at least, culture comes mostly in the form of 
attentional paths, which restrain implicitly the individuals’ scope of possible 
action, perception and representation.  
The definition of culture as differential attention to social saliencies blurs 
the distinction between the “proximal” sense of culture-as-form and the 
“distal” sense of culture-as-content. In fact, culture manifests itself both in the 
cognitive and emotional filter that enables the mind to count certain 
phenomena as worthy of attention and in the representations that stand out 
against a background that goes largely unnoticed. But how do individuals 
handle these complex cultural layers? This is precisely the issue that Jaan 
VALSINER raises. To him, it is essential to highlight one evolutionary fact: 
human creativity and flexibility. His idea is to invert the classical evolutionary 
perspective: instead of characterizing evolution as the selection of fixed 
patterns of problem resolution (algorithms), he insists on the constant creativity 
that adaptation to the environment imposes on humans. For him, it is the con-
tinual and non-systematic variation of the homo sapiens ecological niche that 
triggered the evolution of cognition and culture. Human cognition had to adapt 
to the “forward-oriented pre-adaptation efforts of the organism to live within 
not-yet-known conditions” (Valsiner, this volume, p. 259). Human psychology 
is therefore characterized by flexibility and imagination, which are necessary 
for making predictions in a basically unforeseeable world where meanings 
have to be constantly elaborated. These imaginative capacities, coupled with 
the need to control the environment, favored the emergence of culture, which 
can be defined as a “set of socially created action, feeling and thinking tools” 
(Valsiner, this volume, p. 258). Once stabilized in a population, these tools 
become part of the environment and trigger new cognitive adaptations. Culture 
thus involves multi-layer processes “by nature”: culture bearers are engaged in 
the complex self-organization of a given “cultural-psychological system” that 
implements a hierarchy of “cultural organizers” in intra-personal, mental 
domains as well as inter-personal domains. For Valsiner, as long as organiza-
tional order is maintained, culture tends to function in a proximal way. But 
when this order is shaken, for instance when an encyclopedia is introduced to 
an Orthodox Jewish family, the person enters a state of doubt and can 
explicitly recruit other cultural resources in order to make sense of the new 
situation. This “psychological distancing” from the immediate social context 
fosters meaning-making efforts and personal reflection. Hence, when viewed 
from this angle, the interplay between distal and proximal dimensions of cul-
ture is not the matter of the observer but of the agent: it is a phenomenological 
experience that is rooted in the depths of our biographical trajectories.  
Given the importance of the capacities that enable human beings to adjust 
to the orderliness of the socio-cultural world, but also and above all to its 
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indeterminacy, the mainstream social scientist’s view of culture bearers as 
literally “mindless” can no longer hold. Research programs focusing on the 
capacities necessary for social and/or cultural animals to cope with their mate-
rial and symbolic environment are needed; the fine-grained, empirical 
description of the cognitive workings of society and culture can indeed help to 
explain the ongoing cognitive, social and cultural adeptness of humankind. It 
can also help to explain the propensity of human beings to describe themselves 
as beyond the reach of nature. That is this distinctive propensity that makes this 
interdisciplinary issue of Intellectica both necessary and risky. 
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